





Lions or Lambs?: Militia Performance in the  
War of 1812 
 
 As the British advanced on Washington D.C. in 1814, they scattered the American army 
arrayed against them, most militia taking flight without ever firing their weapons.  One American 
said they ran like sheep chased by wolves.1  Less than three weeks later, the British met another 
American army composed of militia at North Point near Baltimore.  This time, however, the 
militia stood firm inflicting heavy casualties, including the British commander Major General 
Robert Ross, before withdrawing in good order.  One news report after the battle said the men 
had fought like lions.2 
 Since before the guns silent in 1815 Americans, Canadians, and Britons have argued over 
what role the United States militia played in the War of 1812.  Men like Frank Cassell3 and 
Major Darrin Haas4 who focus on the militia’s greatest victory at the Battle of North Point, 
conclude that they were a capable fighting force.  Cassell also emphasizes the leadership of 
Samuel Smith to allow the militia’s success.  Other historians like Donald Hickey,5 C. Edward 
Skeen,6 Mary Ellen Rowe,7 John Carland,8 and Alan Taylor9 argue that the militia was an 
unreliable system, incapable of handling national security.  However, a deeper look at the war 
shows that the militia were capable of performing well, very well, when placed under the 
command of intelligent officers.  Many of the defeats attributed to the militia were actually the 
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fault of the commanders.  These men, because they usually wrote the reports of battles, often 
used the militia as a convenient scapegoat.  In reality, the militia in the War of 1812 proved 
themselves time and time again to be a capable force when ably led. 
 
The Northwest Theatre 
The war in the Northwest began with the surrender of General William Hull’s army at 
Detroit in August 1812 to Sir Issac Brock’s smaller force, a humiliating blow to American arms 
at the war’s very outset.  While fighting on the frontier continued into 1814, the American 
campaign effectively ended with the crushing American victory at the Battle of the Thames, won 
almost entirely by the Kentucky militia.10  The Northwest Frontier was far from the major 
population centers of both Canada and the United States and so it was considered of less 
importance than the Niagara and St. Lawrence Fronts.  Both sides committed few resources and 
few regulars to this theatre and so most of the fighting was done for the United States by the 
militia and for the British by the Native Americans, who, led by Tecumseh, were more active in 
this theatre than any other.  Because it was fought almost entirely by militia, the American 
campaign in the Northwest shows that their performance was dependent upon their leadership. 
Major actions in the Northwest began with General William Hull’s advance into Canada 
from Detroit.  With an army of twenty-five hundred, Hull invaded Canada in the summer of 
1812.  His goal was to take the British outpost at Amherstburg but after one of his militia 
detachments was routed by the Natives at Brownstown,11 he withdrew his force back to Detroit.  
What followed has become legendary in Canadian history and one of the most embarrassing 
episodes in American military history.  Brock, taking advantage of Hull’s retreat, gathered all his 
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available forces and sailed to Amherstburg, from there he marched to Detroit, rendezvousing 
with Tecumseh along the way, bringing his force to roughly, 1250 men.  When he reached 
Detroit, Brock convinced Hull that he was surrounded by a massive army of Natives.  Hull 
apparently became so distraught that he broke down completely, drinking profusely and chewing 
such huge wads of tobacco that spittle dribbled down his uniform.  Eventually, fearing a 
massacre by the Natives and citing his lack of powder, Hull surrendered his army to a force half 
its size.  When the British captured the fort they found huge quantities of gunpowder. 12 
Additionally, Hull cited the unreliability of the militia as a reason for his surrender. But 
Colonel Lewis Cass of the Ohio militia wrote a scathing letter to the War Department accusing 
Hull of incompetence and cowardice.  Cass noted that the defenses of the fort were well 
positioned and would easily have defeated any British attack.  Hull had specifically called into 
question the reliability of troops under Cass, Colonel Findley, and Colonel McArthur but both of 
these officers agreed with Cass’s assessment that the men inside Fort Detroit were ready and able 
to withstand a the British attack.  Countering Hull’s assertion that the militia were unreliable, 
Cass asserted the militia encircled inside the fort could not have run even had they wanted to and 
would have fought with all the more determination, knowing there was no escape. 13  In fact, 
Canadian historian John Carland says that Hull’s militia were eager to engage the British so that 
they might return home in time for the fall harvest.14 
The disaster at Fort Detroit eliminated the only major American force in the Northwest 
and the United States was forced to assemble an army even more hastily than their original force.  
William Henry Harrison, a brigadier general in the Kentucky militia, was given command of this 
force.  To build an army, he called on the citizens of Kentucky and Ohio to serve for thirty 
days.15  Harrison’s messages, along with the fear of Indian attacks had the desired effect and he 
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wrote the War Department in late September 1812 that the United States now had approximately 
five thousand active militia in the Northwest.16  However, many of these men were only 
temporary enlistees and still more were stationed close to home.  Kentucky Governor Issac 
Shelby informed Harrison that, while he would give him what support he could, his primary 
interest was to defend Kentucky’s many small and isolated towns.17 
The most daunting challenge Harrison now faced was a shortage of supplies.  On 
September 5, 1812, he wrote that he had sixteen hundred mounted men but could not move the 
rest of his force due to the lack of “two essential articles.”18  Far from the centers of production 
with no well established roads, Harrison had to subsist almost entirely on local suppliers.  The 
situation got so bad that at one point that Harrison called for volunteers who could provide 
themselves with food.19 
Harrison’s force also experienced the same discipline problems that plagued the entire 
American army early in the war.  On October 12, when Brigadier General Edward Tupper found 
that when his Ohio militia discovered that he was to be replaced by General James Winchester, a 
regular Army officer, they refused to march.  However, it is worth noting that a company of 
“United States’ Rangers,” possibly a regular unit, also refused to march.20  Tupper called them, 
“a force so insubordinate, as that every man’s will is his law, little can be expected to the officers 
but a harvest of mortification and disgrace.”21  While the Ohioans refused to march, Tupper’s 
(now Winchester’s) Kentuckians expressed a desire to press forward.22 
In December 1812, Lieutenant Colonel John Campbell led an expedition against the 
Native Americans along the Maumee River.  His force of militia successfully marched into 
enemy territory, destroyed two villages, and returned escorting forty-two prisoners.  Campbell, 
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considered by some one of the best American officers of the war, had much to say about the men 
under his command.  He noted that the Pittsburgh Blues, a volunteer company, performed with 
“alacrity,” moving under fire to a position in the centre of the battle and laying down an effective 
fire that quieted the enemy to their front.23  He also said that whenever called upon, the Kentucky 
light dragoons under Captain Johnson were always ready to act, “They are fine fellows with a 
few exceptions, and as brave as any men in the world.”24 
The militia played a prominent role in the Battle of the River Raisin and at the later 
Massacre at the River Raisin.  The Battle of the River Raisin was a disaster for the United States 
and more Americans died in that battle than any other in the war.  After capturing Frenchtown on 
the Raisin River in a small skirmish, General Winchester occupied the town but made no plans 
for defending it.  Ammunition was brought in but was left on the wagons and not distributed.  A 
council of war discussed moving the troops, who had set up camps virtually where they finished 
the battle or wherever they saw fit, but nothing was done.  Even when warned of the approach of 
the British army under General Henry Proctor, Winchester made no moves to prepare his defense 
and did not alert his army to the possibility.  No contingency plans or rally points were given out 
either.25 
When the British and Natives attacked, the Americans were caught off guard and thrown 
into confusion.  General Winchester moved about trying to evaluate the situation and gave orders 
to rally his troops but in a quiet voice.  He was later captured when he tried to rally a group of 
British troops in the confusion.  The battle was chaotic and many Americans fled but some 
Kentucky militia fought tenaciously until ordered to surrender by General Winchester.  Many of 
the militia who did surrender were later murdered by Native warriors in what became known as 
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the River Raisin Massacre.  The many mistakes of General Winchester, a regular officer, 
doomed the militia and almost the entire American force was killed or captured.26 
In March 1813, Harrison sent the War Department a situation report.  He noted the 
disinclination to military service which now pervaded the Northwest after the call ups of late 
1812.  He did, however, compliment the men who had responded in that hour of crisis calling 
them, “superior to any militia that ever took the field in modern times.”27  He noted the 
effectiveness of the militia, in particular the Kentucky mounted militia.28  
The next major action in the Northwest was the Siege of Fort Meigs in Ohio.  British 
General Henry Proctor’s force besieged Harrison’s army, reduced by expired enlistments, in Fort 
Meigs on April 28.  However, reinforcements were already on the way and on May 2, about 
sixteen hundred Kentucky militia arrived.  Approximately eight hundred were diverted under 
Colonel William Dudley were sent to attack some British cannon bombarding the fort and 
disable them.  The Kentuckians quickly routed the British gunners and took the battery.  
However, the militia ignored orders to return to the fort and continued to pursue the British.  
They were soon surrounded by the remainder of the British army and forced to surrender after 
taking heavy casualties.  Harrison wrote of the battle, “It rarely occurs that a general has to 
complain of the excessive ardour of his men, yet such appears always to be the case whenever 
the Kentucky militia are engaged.  It is indeed the source of all their misfortunes.  They appear to 
think that their valour can alone accomplish any thing.”29 Harrison also remarked that Colonel 
Dudley of the Kentucky militia was forced to turn his pike against his soldiers to force them to 
halt their pursuit of the enemy.  Harrison also said, “Such temerity, although not so disgraceful, 
is scarcely less fatal than cowardice.”30 
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In support of Dudley’s attack, Harrison ordered a sortie from the fort which also captured 
several British batteries and took forty-one prisoners before being forced back into the fort with 
heavy casualties.  The militia played a critical role in this engagement as well, composing the 
majority of the detachment.  Harrison was impressed with their performance in the engagement 
and said, “That American regulars (although they were raw recruits) and such men as compose 
the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania and Petersburg (Va.) volunteers, should behave so well is not to be 
wondered at; but that a company of militia should maintain its ground against four times its 
number, as did Captain Sebree’s, of the Kentucky, is truly astonishing.”31  Harrison stated that 
the British were also impressed; the men watching the American storming and spiking of the 
batteries said that they did not believe they had ever seen so much done in so little time.32 
While both American expeditions were eventually defeated, they succeeded in 
accomplishing their objective of neutralizing the British artillery.  Without heavy guns to 
bombard the fort, Proctor had no chance of weakening its defenses.  He also lacked the numbers 
to besiege the fort properly by cutting off all supply and reinforcement.  Therefore, on May 9 
Proctor abandoned the siege and retired to Detroit.  Harrison’s army followed.  After the 
American naval victory on Lake Erie on September 10, 1813, the British under Proctor 
abandoned Amherstburg and Detroit.  Harrison’s army, reinforced by the arrival of Governor 
Issac Shelby with more Kentucky militia, was ferried to Amherstburg by Perry’s squadron, from 
where the army set off in pursuit of Proctor’s retreating troops.33  Shelby’s militia, the rawest 
recruits in the army, were placed on the left of the column, moving through heavy woods.  
Harrison recognized that the militia usually performed better in the woods and hoped to use this 
to his advantage.34  Unlike the militia of Ohio, New York, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts who  
refused to march into Canada, the Kentuckians had no qualms about invading another country.35 
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Harrison ordered Colonel William Johnson’s Kentucky militia cavalry forward to secure 
three bridges along their path.  The first, they took easily and the second, they succeeded in 
storming though under fire from British dragoons.  The third, they found destroyed.  By this 
time, the British had formed for battle in a position along Harrison’s advance with flank 
protection, meaning Harrison was forced to launch a frontal assault.  Harrison was forming his 
men to attack when he received a message from Colonel Johnson who believed that the British 
line could be broken by a sudden charge.  Harrison, though he admitted later the attack was 
highly unorthodox, approved and Johnson’s cavalry thundered forward. 36 
Astonishingly, the Kentuckians’ broke the British line almost instantly and the majority 
of them surrendered.  The Kentucky militia cavalry then turned to engage Tecumseh’s warriors 
who had already engaged the American left.  The Natives, caught between the mounted militia 
and the Americans on foot, fought, and died, heroically but to no avail.  Tecumseh fell trying to 
rally his warriors, allegedly shot by Colonel Johnson.  Tecumseh died on the field and his dream 
of a pan-Native American confederacy died with him.  Shortly after the Battle of the Thames,  
delegates from approximately half of the allied tribes sent delegates to Harrison requesting 
peace.37 
The laurels of battle could not belong to any but the militia.  Less than 150 of the 3300 
Americans in the battle had been regulars and they had played no special role.  It was universally 
recognized that the Kentucky mounted militia under William Johnson had won the battle.  
Afterwards Harrison said, “The American backwoodsmen ride better in the woods than any other 
people.  A musket or rifle is no impediment to them, being accustomed to carry them on 
horseback from their earliest youth.”38  Another American officer reported, “It is really a novel 
thing that raw militia stuck upon horses, with muskets in their hands instead of sabres, should be 
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able to pierce the British lines with such complete effect.”39  The Kentuckians had in just over a 
year acquired a reputation so fierce that one British officer, when questioned as to how a 
civilized nation could employ Native warriors, responded by saying, “as you employed the 
Kentuckians, we had a right to make use of the Indians.”40 
From July 1812 to October 1813, the United States went from total collapse to victory on 
the Northwest Frontier.  Such a feat simply would not have been possible without the militia.  
While men like William Hull and James Winchester were responsible for disasters that 
annihilated entire American armies, men like William Henry Harrison and William Johnson 
provided able leadership that led the militia to victory over the British and crushed the last real 
Native American threat to the United States.  The Fall of Detroit was the first major American 
defeat in the War of 1812 and the Battle of the Thames was the first major land victory.  The 
Northwest Frontier served to demonstrate that American militia, when well led, could perform 
well on the field of battle.  These lessons would be put to use in other theatres of the war that saw 
continued fighting in 1814 and 1815. 
The Niagara Theatre 
 While initially considered of secondary importance compared to the St. Lawrence 
Theatre, the Niagara Front became the most contested arena of the War of 1812.  More major 
battles were fought and more men died on this front than any other in the war.  The best 
commanders on both sides fought, and often died, along the thirty mile stretch from Lake 
Ontario to Lake Erie.  The militia’s role in the fighting was not as overwhelming as it was in the 
Northwest or in the South but they still played a decisive role and still comprised the majority of 
American forces in the area for the duration of the war.  Their performance here was also more 
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checkered than in any other front. But by the end of the war, thanks to the leadership of men like 
Peter Porter, Jacob Brown, and Winfield Scott, the militia had become a critical and reliable part 
of the American war effort. 
 The war on the Niagara was slow to begin.  When word reached the United States that the 
British had ended some of the policies that had led to war, Sir George Prevost, Governor of 
Canada, and Major General Henry Dearborn, Commander in Chief of the United States Army, 
arranged several truces in anticipation of a possible peace.  This time allowed the militia to be 
brought in to bolster Major General Van Rensselaer’s army, which as late as September 1, had 
consisted of less than seven hundred poorly supplied regulars.  When he arrived, Van Rensselaer 
described his men as hungry, unpaid, and unclothed.  By the time hostilities resumed on 
September 8, Van Rensselaer’s force was over three thousand strong and far better supplied than 
it had been one week earlier.41 
 Still, however, Van Rensselaer delayed his attack, waiting for more reinforcements and 
supplies.  He also had to contend with Brigadier General Alexander Smyth.  Smyth was 
technically Van Rensselaer’s subordinate but refused to obey his orders because Van Rensselaer 
was a militia officer while Smyth was a regular.  Smyth ignored several summons to war 
councils and refused to acknowledge receipt of Van Rensselaer’s orders.  Smyth’s force of 
sixteen hundred regulars was supposed to launch a simultaneous attack across the Niagara River 
in support of Van Rensselaer.  While he tried to work out this critical component of his plan of 
attack, Van Rensselaer’s army sat idle.42 
 In October, Van Rensselaer received reports stating that if the militia were not put to use, 
they would leave the army.43  With this information, he decided to cancel Smyth’s supporting 
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attack and go ahead with his own crossing of the Niagara.  What followed was a combination of 
farce and heroism that became an American disaster.  Originally planning to depart on October 
11, Van Rensselaer received word on the previous night that one of the boat pilots had taken his 
boat and left the army taking all the assembled oars.  Van Rensselaer postponed the attack until 
the 13th to replace the oars.  He sent word to General Smyth who had finally decided to respond, 
however lethargically, to orders.  When he received news of the delay, Smyth, who was moving 
so slowly he could not have participated in the original attack, decided to return to Black Rock 
instead of marching forward to an attack he could now join.44  Furthermore, when Sir Issac 
Brock, the British field commander, sent his aide to arrange an exchange of prisoners, Van 
Rensselaer’s secretary inadvertently alerted the British that an attack was planned for the next 
day.45 
 Finally on October 13, three hundread militia and three hundred regulars crossed the 
Niagara River under Colonel Solomon Van Rensselaer, General Van Rensselaer’s cousin and 
aide.  Solomon, an experienced soldier, led the detachment well but was wounded early in the 
engagement.  Luckily, command fell to one of the greatest American commanders of all time, 
Winfield Scott.  Under his leadership, the Americans successfully stormed the heights at 
Queenston and captured a British battery.  The British, led by Brock, then counterattacked but 
the Americans held their ground.  Brock was killed in the assault and the British were 
temporarily thrown into confusion.  All that was needed were fresh troops to complete the 
American triumph.46 
 However, the American troops refused to cross the river.  Boats carrying the American 
dead and wounded had returned from the Canadian shore and seeing their casualties and hearing 
the fierce battle on the opposite bank drained the enthusiasm from the raw American soldiers.  
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Men who ten days earlier had insisted they be put to use or sent home now opposed the invasion 
of another country on constitutional grounds.  General Van Rensselaer and other officers rode 
desperately along the lines, pleading with the men to cross the river, but all refused.  Finally, 
unable even to convince the civilian boatmen to row across and retrieve the American force, Van 
Rensselaer sent over a few boats with ammunition and a message to the American commander 
telling him not to expect relief and to do whatever he thought best.47  The message was 
effectively permission to surrender. 
The Americans on the Canadian shore, outnumbered two to one, had been forced back to 
the landing site, desperately awaiting reinforcement.  Winfield Scott was wounded as well but 
still continued to lead the defense.  Finally, receiving word that they were on their own, the 
American force requested a truce and agreed to surrender.  Of the six hundred Americans who 
had originally crossed the river, almost half were killed or wounded.48 
The Battle of Queenston Heights has become famous for two reasons.  In Canada, it is 
remembered for the death of Sir Issac Brock, the “Savior of Upper Canada.”  In the United 
States, it is known for the militia’s refusal to cross the Niagara.  While it is indisputable that this 
contributed to the American defeat, the militia were not the only ones who refused to fight on the 
day of battle.  Van Rensselaer had roughly nine hundred regulars in his army, yet only three 
hundred crossed in the first wave.49  This left six hundred men, two-thirds of the regular 
component, standing beside the militia on the American shore, refusing to cross into Canada.  
Van Rensselaer said, “one third part of the idle men might have saved all.”50  Additionally, 
General Smyth sat idly just a few miles away with sixteen hundred regulars who contributed 
nothing to the battle.51   
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When they did cross the river, the militia conducted themselves well.  Major Mullany, an 
officer in the landing force at Queenston Heights, attested to the “firmness and patriotic 
devotion” of the militia under his command; their “conduct would do honor to veterans.”52  
Indeed, any force that sustained 50 percent casualties cannot be called cowards.  Under men like 
Solomon Rensselaer and Winfield Scott, the militia fought tenaciously, holding off a British and 
Native force twice their size for several hours.  General Van Rensselaer, on the other hand, was a 
well meaning, but inexperienced commander.  He had been appointed to the position to remove 
him from the political scene by New York Governor Daniel Tompkins.53  The Battle of 
Queenston Heights showed the importance of leadership for the American militia, by displaying 
in one battle the extremes of heroism and cowardice that they were capable of achieving. 
In an ironic and tragic twist, one of the men who contributed most to the American defeat 
at Queenston Heights, Alexander Smyth, assumed command of the American forces along the 
Niagara River after Van Rensselaer’s resignation.  Smyth immediately began by making bold 
predictions rather than sound preparations, making statements like “We will soon plant the 
American standard on Canadian soil”54 and “Neither rain, nor sleet, nor snow shall stop the 
embarkation.”55  He was also critical of the militia, who served as a convenient diversion from 
his own failure at the Battle of Queenston Heights.  He wrote, “The affair at Queenston is a 
caution against relying on crowds, who go to the banks of the Niagara, to look at a battle as on a 
theatrical exhibition; who, if they are disappointed at the sights, break their muskets; or if they 
are without rations for a day, desert.”56 
Smyth planned his assault for late November and, sent eight hundred regulars along with 
four hundred militia volunteers from General Tannehill’s Pennsylvania brigade to silence the 
British batteries overlooking the landing site near a place called Frenchman’s Creek.  This they 
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did successfully, despite the capture of thirty Americans.  However, his subsequent embarkation 
was a debacle.  Most of Smyth’s men were left freezing on the bank because he had failed to 
acquire enough boats to ferry all his men across. He found he only had space for twelve hundred 
of the three thousand assembled because he failed to consider the space his artillery would 
occupy on the boats.  Worse still, he spent two hours deliberating whether or not to cross so that 
when the sun rose, his men were standing on the bank or sitting in boats in full view of the 
British.  In a council of war, all Smyth’s commanders recommended postponing the assault 
except Colonel Swift of the New York militia. When many of the militia found they were not to 
be sent into action, they broke their muskets in rage.  Another embarkation later in November 
was called off before sunrise and Smyth ordered his army into winter quarters.57 
While Smyth had blamed the militia for the failure at Queenston Heights, the 
responsibility for the failure of his expedition lay squarely with him. Instead of supplying his 
men with food, winter clothes, tents, or boats to cross the river, Smyth had preoccupied himself 
with predictions of victory.  He was even worse at leading an army than he was at supplying one.  
When the time to attack came, he froze at the lack of his own preparations.  Instead of taking 
initiative and ferrying his three thousand men across in three waves, he called a council of war 
meant to cover his reputation more than make any meaningful decision.  The only officer to 
recommend crossing while still under cover of darkness was a militia officer, Colonel Swift.  
Smyth’s leadership was so bad that his men literally tried to kill him.  Peter Porter, an officer 
who distinguished himself later in the war, reported that the men, both regular and militia, took 
shots at Smyth when he inspected the camp and as a result, Smyth was rarely seen outside his 
tent.58  Other men took a less aggressive stance and simply left.  Smyth reported that in the 
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twenty-four hours following the second aborted attack, six hundred men from the Pennsylvania 
militia deserted.59   
Brigadier General Porter called the militia under his command, consisting of men from 
New York, Pennsylvania, and Maryland, “a corps which has, on every occasion while on the 
lines, shown great exactness of discipline, promptitude, and zeal for the service.”60  When 
provided an opportunity to act under able leadership, the militia proved their worth, as did the 
force that crossed the Niagara at Queenston Heights and Frenchman’s Creek.  However, when 
led by men like Smyth who were more talk than action the militia revolted or deserted en masse. 
The first half of 1813 was quiet on the Niagara Front.  The Americans captured Fort 
George in a brilliant but relatively bloodless action and the militia performed well at the Battle of 
Stoney Creek, although an overestimation of British strength led the Americans to retreat.61  In 
August, General James Wilkinson recommended replacing the regulars stationed at Fort George 
with militia so that the regulars could be transferred to his assault on Montreal.62  He showed that 
the Americans had learned some lessons regarding use of militia in a letter to Secretary of War 
John Armstrong by advising him that the militia not be called out until just before the attack so 
as not to alert the British.  Wilkinson also suggested that the militia not be called out until needed 
to avoid ending their enlistments too early.63  Armstrong wrote back that he would call up two 
thousand militia but that raising more would be difficult due to the war-weariness setting in New 
York.64 
Meanwhile, Peter Porter’s militia remained engaged.  In July, the British launched a raid 
at Black Rock, scattering the militia guarding Fort Gibson and burning and looting American 
store houses.  Porter, who had been visiting his family nearby, gathered the militia and set off 
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after the raiders.  They caught up with the British and, against a force of equal strength, the 
militia gave far better than they got.  The British were forced back with heavy casualties, though 
they did manage to secure their loot.65  This battle again showed the importance of leadership in 
militia performance.  Major Adams, a lazy and incompetent officer, had been unable to get his 
men to fight.  General Porter, on the other hand, had taken his militia and inflicted significant 
casualties a British force of equal strength.  
In response to the British raid, the Americans called out more militia to guard Black 
Rock.  On September 17, Porter reported that most remained for fourteen days and then began to 
desert.  He wrote the War Department that the militia could not be relied upon to hold a static 
position, as they would most likely desert.  He did believe, however, that they would be 
extremely useful in offensive operations.  He suggested that he be permitted to call up twelve 
hundred men, given four artillery pieces, and allowed to invade Canada.  He believed that this 
would allow the militia to give the best possible service, tying down British forces away from the 
main attack at Montreal and protecting the American side of the Niagara.66  In early October, 
Brigadier General George McClure issued a call for volunteers for a two-month period to 
undertake the expedition suggested by Porter.  McClure said, “I wish none to volunteer who may 
have any constitutional objections to cross the Niagara River.  One thousand four hundred of my 
brigade have already volunteered to cross the river, and go wherever they may be required; and 
600 of them are now doing duty at Fort George.”67   
However, before these men arrived the British attacked Fort George.  The militia, under a 
Colonel Chapin, fell back in good order to Fort George under fire from a superior British force.  
Chapin then sallied from the fort with his men and drove the British away.  The militia alone had 
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fought in this battle as all the American regulars had been sent east to support Wilkinson’s 
attack.68 It shows what they were capable of accomplishing when led by good officers. 
Brigadier General McClure’s force was not allowed to pursue the planned expedition but 
was instead ordered to remain in Fort George to protect it against British attack.  The militia held 
the post, but became wild and unruly.  McClure called them “ungovernable”69 and said that they 
became “insufficient to go against the enemy.”70  When their enlistments expired in December 
he said, “I found it impossible to retain the militia in service one day beyond their term.”  Even 
when offered a $2/month bounty, they refused to stay, though some took the bounty before 
leaving.”71  Now vastly outnumbered by British forces, McClure ordered his forces to abandon 
Fort George and fall back across the river to Fort Niagara.  On December 18, the British 
launched a night attack on Fort Niagara which took the defenders by surprise.  The garrison 
commander, Captain Leonard, was a drunkard who, despite being warned of a pending attack, 
took no measures to prepare the fort or its garrison for combat.  Still, McClure reported that one 
detachment of militia broke out of the attack and was able to escape despite being surrounded by 
superior forces.72  Once more, inadequate leadership had cost the Americans, and the militia, 
dearly.  In response, McClure issued a militia draft for all able bodied men to protect the 
American settlements along the Niagara the day the fort fell.  Four days later, he wrote that many 
volunteers were coming in, responding to the crisis.73   
The year ended poorly for the militia.  On December 30, General Phineas Riall attacked 
Buffalo with around one thousand British troops accompanied by militia and Natives.  The 
Americans, commanded by General Hall, fought well for about half an hour before the right 
flank collapsed for no apparent reason.  To avoid being outflanked, Hall ordered a retreat which 
turned into a rout and the British burned Buffalo.74 
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Eighteen thirteen had been a year of defeats and victories for the militia.  They had 
performed well at Stoney Creek but had been denied the opportunity to attain what General 
McClure believed they were capable of.  Under men like Major Adams and Captain Leonard, the 
militia had been disgraced and lost the most important American outpost on the Niagara Front.  
However men like Peter Porter had shown what the militia was truly capable of and under his 
leadership, they would march to glory in 1814. 
The war picked up again in May 1814 when the militia assisted in repelling a British raid 
on Oswego.  Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell, the American commander, said, “It would be injustice 
were I not to acknowledge and report the zeal and patriotism evinced by the militia, who arrived 
at a short notice, and were anxious to be useful.”75  They continued to guard the American side 
of the Niagara until June when they invaded Canada again under Major General Jacob Brown, a 
New York militia officer.  Brown, who would later become Commander-in-Chief of the United 
States Army, led the Americans on the Niagara Front through some of the toughest battles of the 
war. 
Their next action was the Battle of Chippewa where, under General Porter, the militia 
drove the British light troops and their Native allies from the woods.  Advancing, the militia met 
the British main force head on and, outnumbered and outgunned, were quickly driven back.  
However, Brown commented in his report that, “The volunteers and Indians performed their 
part; they drove the enemy’s Indians and light troops until they met the British army: they meet 
the general’s approbation”76 and “The conduct of General Porter has been conspicuously gallant.  
We could not expect him to contend with the British column of regulars which appeared upon 
the plains of Chippewa.  It was no cause of surprise to me, to see his command retire before this 
column.”77  The militia had performed well in the battle and Porter said, “Had General Scott 
19 
 
been at hand to support the volunteers when they first met the British line,” the battle “would 
doubtless have presented quite a different aspect.”78  The upcoming Battle of Lundy’s Lane 
however, would put Porter and the militia to the test. 
The Battle of Lundy’s Lane was a nightmarish engagement fought mostly in the dark.  
The opposing armies met each other entirely by accident, hastily formed for battle and urgently 
called for reinforcements.  Scott’s Brigade, after being mauled by British artillery, seized the 
guns and forced the British infantry back.  During Scott’s attack, the 1st and 23rd Infantry 
Regiments broke and ran for the rear.  Brown sent up reserves and it was Porter’s militia who 
filled the gap.  The outnumbered American militia held their ground against the men who had 
vanquished Napoleon, the lines often engaging at point blank range and with bayonets.  Brown 
described the action, “Under command of General Porter, the militia volunteers of Pennsylvania 
and New York, stood undismayed amidst the hottest fire, and repulsed the veterans opposed to 
them.”79  “He further asserted, ‘They fought with the coolness & discipline of regular troops.’”80  
The battle ended when Brown, who had been wounded and taken to the rear, ordered a retreat, 
fearing the destruction of his army.  Porter balked and urged Brigadier General Eliazar Ripley, 
the only other unwounded American general, to hold his ground.  He said later they, “ought not 
to have been dictated to by a wounded man four miles from the scene of action.”81  However, 
despite the retreat, the Americans, and particularly the militia, had won the respect of their 
commanders and opponents.  General Brown said afterwards, “It was with great pleasure I saw 
the good order and intrepidity of General Porter’s volunteers from the moment of their arrival; 
but during the last charge of the enemy those qualities were conspicuous.”82  Porter wrote 
Governor Tompkins of New York that his militia had lost more men than any other unit adding, 
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“I mention this not to boast, but to show how unequally the policy observed towards volunteers 
bears upon them.”83 
The Siege of Fort Erie was the last major action on the Niagara Front and the militia were 
again, conspicuously engaged.  Arriving in early August, the British besieged the fort until late 
September.  Porter’s militia brigade, with the veterans of Chippewa and Lundy’s Lane reinforced 
by recruits from Buffalo, was positioned in the center of the American lines, a position of great 
importance that would only be given to reliable troops with a tough commander.  Porter and the 
militia did not disappoint.84  On September 4, Porter’s militia sallied from the fort and fought the 
British for six hours before retiring, in good order, because of a thunderstorm.  Major Matteson, 
their commander, said his men “behaved in a Spirit and manner characteristic of spartan 
bravery.”85  Again on the 17th, Porter’s men sallied out to attack one of the British batteries.  
They successfully destroyed a great deal of equipment and killed, wounded, or captured nearly 
eight hundred British soldiers for the loss of five hundred of their own.  Not long afterwards the 
British broke off the siege.86 
This last action of the militia on the Niagara Front is a perfect example of what the militia 
could achieve under good leadership.  The American militia in the War of 1812 may have lacked 
discipline at times, but they certainly did not lack courage, and when given the opportunity, they 
displayed it magnificently.  Men like Peter Porter and Jacob Brown showed that the militia could 
stand up not just to British regulars, but to veterans of the Napoleonic Wars.  Despite early 
setbacks, the militia won the respect of the British on the Niagara Front.  After the Battle of 
Lundy’s Lane, one British veteran said that he had never seen more determined men than those 
he faced at Lundy’s Lane.87  In the words of Jacob Brown, “The Militia of New York have 




The St. Lawrence Theatre 
 Though it was intended to be the main theatre of operations for both sides, the St. 
Lawrence River region saw little fighting in 1812.  Major General Henry Dearborn, Commander-
in-Chief of the United States Army, made no attempt to move his army until late in the season. 
Though more than half his force were regulars, they were regulars in name only.  Having been 
raised in only a few months, the regulars in Dearborn’s army were as raw as his militia, if not 
more so. According to Canadian historian John Carland, the militia at times showed more 
discipline and cohesion than the regulars as most of the militia at least knew each other and had 
drilled together.89  However, the best drilled and equipped militia in the Union, those from New 
England, were often reluctant to fight in what they called “Mr. Madison’s War.”90  After his 
troops engaged each other in a small skirmish and half the militia refused to cross into Canada, 
Dearborn called off the invasion.91 
 The armies did not become active again until late summer of 1813.  After Dearborn was 
recalled in June, Major General James Wilkinson took command of the army assembled at 
Plattsburgh.  Wilkinson was a political animal who was constantly dodging charges of treason 
and spying.  After his death, he was discovered to have been a spy on the Spanish payroll since 
1787.92  In 1813, he was appointed to command the main American thrust into Canada and his 
conduct during this campaign bordered on treasonous. 
 Wilkinson planned to cooperate with another American army but its commander, General 
Wade Hampton, was little better than Wilkinson.  Both were more concerned with preserving 
their reputations than with winning a war and they bickered constantly.93  One officer said of 
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Hampton, “Such has been the general’s conduct on some occasions, that I have, in common with 
other officers, been induced to believe that he was under the influence of a too free use of 
spirituous liquors.”94  Wilkinson, on the other hand, was so cowardly that he intentionally 
delayed until John Armstrong, Secretary of War, ordered him to attack.  Wilkinson still refused 
to march unless given explicit permission to surrender, if necessary.  With written orders to 
attack, Wilkinson hoped to shift blame for any failure on his superiors.95   
Hampton attacked first and, after crossing into Canada, waited for one month while 
Wilkinson delayed.  When Hampton’s men met the British at the Battle of the Chateauguay, he 
planned a pincer movement to outflank the main British defensive line but his flanking force 
wandered through the woods so long that the British discovered its presence hours before they 
attacked.  Additionally, instead of using his superior artillery to keep the British focused to their 
front, Hampton never attacked until his flanking force had already been engaged and driven 
back.  At this point, the Americans saw British reserves rushing forward to bugle calls sounding 
the advance.  This convinced the Americans they were facing a superior force and they retreated 
in disorder before a force less than half their size.96 
Wilkinson’s force did no better.  Wilkinson, to add to his many flaws, was severely ill but 
refused to relinquish command.  He combated his illness by taking large doses of laudanum and 
was often described as “giddy.”97  When his force finally met the British on November 11, he 
ordered a frontal attack that had some early success but quickly ground down without 
coordination.  The various American units simply retreated one by one as they ran out of 
ammunition after blasting the British fortifications for two and a half hours.98  Despite 
Wilkinson’s poor performance, the American units, including the militia, stayed in the fight for 
over two hours showing that they had the mettle to remain in a prolonged engagement.  
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Wilkinson wrote, “this affair, which certainly reflects high honour on the valour of the American 
soldier, as no example can be produced of undisciplined men, with inexperienced officers, 
braving a fire of two hours and a half, without quitting the field or yielding to their 
antagonists.”99 
For the most part, the abysmal quality of the American commander in the St. Lawrence 
Theatre was reflected in the armies they led.  One officer in Hampton’s army wrote, “The army, 
consisting of about 4000 men, was composed principally of recruits who had been but a short 
time in the service…a spirit of subordination was foreign to their views…a want of system in the 
management of the army was readily discovered by every military man.”100  Another officer in 
the theatre noted, “the extreme lack of experience of the officers of all grades.”101  The St. 
Lawrence Theatre was the only one in which American regulars were more numerous than the 
militia.102  The militia were not the source of all setbacks the Americans faced in the War of 
1812.  When placed under useless officers, the regulars collapsed into disorder and chaos just as 
quickly and easily as their militia counterparts. 
The St. Lawrence Theatre finally saw major action in 1814, but it was a different war 
than the one that had begun in 1812.  By this time, Napoleon had been defeated and thousands of 
British veterans of the Peninsular War were on their way to North America.  The largest 
contingent landed in Quebec and marched to Montreal, planning to strike south towards 
Plattsburgh.  The British had finally assembled sufficient strength to invade the United States.103  
The American army by this time had also become a force to be reckoned with.  The weakest 
officers had been weeded out and the new commanders were capable and brave.  They were, 
however, hopelessly outnumbered in the St. Lawrence region.104 
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Brigadier General Alexander Macomb called out the New York and Vermont militia in 
anticipation of a British invasion. He wrote that though many whose homes were in the path of 
the invaders fled, those who stayed were “exceedingly useful.”105  By early September, General 
Mooers of the New York militia had brought in seven hundred men.106  As the British 
approached Plattsburgh, Macomb sent his militia forward to disrupt their advance.  The militia, 
however, constantly retreated in front of the British; the invaders were never even forced to 
deploy for battle.  Macomb finally realized the cause of the Americans’ panic when he looked 
back and saw red coated cavalry sitting atop a hill behind; it was the New York militia cavalry in 
their red uniforms.  After ordering the cavalry to the rear, the militia rallied but not before being 
driven back to Macomb’s planned defensive line behind the Saranac River.  The British 
reconnoitered the American lines and according to Macomb, “An attempt was also made to cross 
the upper bridge, where the militia handsomely drove them back.”107   
On September 11, as the American Navy gained its famous victory on Lake Champlain, 
the British army attempted to storm Macomb’s defenses.  The attack was easily repulsed and 
British General George Prevost called off the assault when he saw his fleet was destroyed.  This 
did not stop the militia from winning laurels.  Macomb, writing to the Secretary of War, said, 
“The militia behaved with great spirit after the first day, and the volunteers of Vermont were 
exceedingly serviceable.”108  He noted that the British attack was repulsed “at the ford, by the 
brave volunteers and militia, where he suffered severely in killed, wounded, and prisoners.…  
The woods at this place were very favourable to the operations of the militia.”109 
The British withdrew as a result of the naval action on Lake Champlain, but the militia 
under Alexander Macomb had played their part. They had stood beside their regular comrades in 
the face of a force five times their size.110  The St. Lawrence Theatre had been intended as the 
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main American thrust in 1812 and 1813, yet due to terrible commanders the region did not see 
significant action until 1814 during a British offensive.  The importance of good commanders 
was evident in this theatre.  Henry Dearborn called off an attack without ever meeting serious 
resistance.  James Wilkinson and Wade Hampton launched what can barely be called attacks 
before returning home to defend what was most dear to them, their reputations.  The only major 
combat the militia saw in the St. Lawrence Theatre was at the Battle of Plattsburgh and there, 
under Macomb, they proved their worth.  President James Madison addressed Congress after the 
battle saying, “In another recent attack by a powerful force on our troops at Plattsburgh, of which 
regulars made a part only, the enemy, after a perseverance for many hours, was finally compelled 
to seek safety in a hasty retreat, with our gallant bands pressing upon him.”111  President 
Madison’s message, however grandiose, accurately captured the essential role the militia played 
in the Battle of Plattsburgh and the St. Lawrence Theatre. 
 
The Atlantic Theatre 
 The Atlantic Coast was the scene of the most humiliating battle of the war for both the 
militia and the United States.  After the Battle of Bladensburg, a British army was able to destroy 
the young American capital, something no other army in history can claim.  Yet only a few 
weeks later the British were met by an army of militia that stood its ground for several hours, 
killed the British commander, and earned the respect of men who had fought Napoleon’s armies.  
As in the Northwest and the South, the fighting along the Atlantic was done almost entirely by 
the militia because the American regulars were attempting to conquer Canada.  The militia 
26 
 
defeats on the Atlantic Coast were more drastic than in any other theatre, yet, as in other theatres, 
by war’s end they had proved that they could stand up to British regulars when well led. 
 From the war’s outset, the United States was concerned about British raids along its long 
and vulnerable coastline.  While American frigates were very powerful, they were not numerous 
and the Navy had no ships of the line.  Therefore, stopping the British on the seas was impossible 
and it fell to the Army to defend the coast of the United States.  However without a strong navy, 
every point along the coast had to be prepared to withstand a British attack.  General Stuart of 
the Maryland militia wrote, “The cruel course of the war waged by the enemy upon our 
extensive water courses, has forced me to call into service a great body of our militia.”112  With 
the regulars along the Canadian border, that meant the militia bore this almost impossible 
burden.113 
 As in other theatres, it was difficult to keep the militia at their station when idle.  
Lieutenant Colonel Freeman, commanding Norfolk in 1812, also complained about compelling 
the militia to perform work details.  He said that many of the men, “have taken up the strange 
opinion that it is not their duty to turn out in fatigue parties…because they are not quartered 
within Fort Norfolk.”114  Supplies were often hard to come by.  Freeman reported that many of 
his men died from disease, being exposed to winter rains without tents or uniforms.  His 
successor, Brigadier General Robert Taylor, wrote to the Secretary of War in 1813 pleading for 
funds to pay his men for their service.  The terrible conditions made desertion an endemic 
problem and Taylor observed, “The Army is threatened with the most serious consequences from 
the frequency of desertions.”115 
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 Despite these atrocious circumstances, the militia gave a good account of themselves in 
battle.  At the Battle of Craney Island on June 22, 1813, 600 assembled militia and 150 sailors 
drove back a British force of over, fifteen hundred with heavy casualties.  Not only did the 
militia show the courage to stand up to this large British force, they had the discipline to hold 
their fire until the British were at very close range.  Three days later, the British took Hampton 
but only after fierce fighting against a militia force five hundred strong.  Their commander 
reported, “We have made a miraculous escape and done the best that perhaps could have been 
done.”116  Craney Island and Hampton showed on a small scale what the militia could 
accomplish under sound leadership.  Sadly, the next major action showed what the British were 
capable of when facing a poorly led militia. 
 When the British under Major General Robert Ross landed at Benedict Point, Maryland, 
in August 1814, Brigadier General William Winder scrambled to gather a force to oppose their 
advance.  The militia were scattered throughout the countryside attempting to defend the many 
small hamlets and harbors from British attack.  Many of the men at home had already been called 
up more than once on false alarms and were reluctant to answer another call.  Winder wrote later, 
“the ineffectiveness of the laws to compel them to turn out, rendered it impossible to have 
procured more.”117  Winder also called for the Pennsylvania militia to come to his aid but none 
arrived until after the battle.  The men Winder gathered spent the next few days marching and 
countermarching.  Unsure of where the British would strike, Winder, instead of sending mounted 
scouts to locate the British, exhausted his troops moving from place to place.118 
 Finally, Winder decided to make a stand along a creek near the town of Bladensburg, 
Maryland.  His exhausted men were still moving into position when the British arrived.  The 
naval gunners and Baltimore artillery began firing with deadly effect but the disciplined British 
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troops continued forward.  Winder described what happened next, “The right and centre of 
Stansbury’s brigade, consisting of lieutenant colonel Ragan’s and Shutez’s regiments, generally 
gave way very soon afterwards, with the exception of about forty rallied by COL Ragan.”119  
While Winder noted that a few companies stood their ground briefly, the Americans were 
quickly overran.  Commodore Joshua Barney, whose sailors now manned cannons on land after 
being forced to burn their ships stated “our own army retreating before them, apparently in much 
disorder.”120  Barney also described a force of five or six hundred Americans “who, to my great 
mortification, made no resistance, giving a fire or two and retired” when attacked by less than 
three hundred British soldiers. 121   
There was one exception to the debacle which became known as “The Bladensburg 
Races.”  Foreshadowing the Battle of North Point, the Baltimore militia, who were better trained 
and disciplined than most militia, stood firm while others fled.  Winder wrote, “The 5th 
Baltimore Regiment, under LTC Sterret…stood their ground, and except for a moment, when 
part of them recoiled a few steps, remained firm and stood until ordered to retreat with a view to 
prevent them from being out flanked.”122  Since 1814, the Battle of Bladensburg has been used as 
to support the position that the militia was unreliable.  The disastrous battle can be attributed to 
Winder, who exhausted his men and failed to destroy a crucial bridge in the path of the British.  
Also critical, Secretary of State James Monroe redeployed Winder’s best troops, the Baltimore 
militia, into an exposed position without informing the commander.  When the British attacked, 
the withdrawal of the Baltimoreans was mistaken for a retreat by the rest of the army, causing the 
rest of the line to collapse.  The Battle of Bladensburg has justifiably been called the greatest 
disgrace ever dealt to American arms.123 Soon, however, the citizen soldiers of Baltimore 
showed the British veterans what the militia were truly capable of. 
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In the days between the burning of Washington and the attack on Baltimore, the British 
launched several raids along the Virginia coast.  While many of them succeeded, the British were 
often decimated by vastly outnumbered bands of militia.  Brigadier General John Hungerford of 
the Virginia militia recalled his men’s steadfastness in one battle, “Permit me to say, that it was 
impossible for men to have conducted themselves with more intrepidity, then the militia on this 
occasion…not a man under my command offered to move, until orders to that effect was 
given.”124  The Virginia militia under Hungerford showed the British their ability.  Now, the 
British prepared to unleash a large force against the City of Baltimore and the citizen-soldiers 
defending it. 
The defenses of Baltimore were stronger than almost anywhere in the United States.  Fort 
McHenry was a powerful bastion, though budgeting had allowed some of the outer works to 
become decrepit.  The city’s greatest strength was its commander, Major General Samuel Smith.  
Smith was a Revolutionary War veteran who had fought in most of the major northern battles in 
1776 and 1777.  Unlike Dearborn, Hull, Wilkinson, and Winchester, Smith was a capable officer 
and, perhaps most importantly, drilled his men constantly.  The Third, or City, Brigade of 
Maryland militia in particular was a well-disciplined fighting force and was one of the best 
militia units in the country.  According to historian Frank Cassell, “Smith’s energetic direction 
had successfully transformed the citizen-soldiers of Baltimore into a force capable of meeting 
regulars on the field of battle.”125  Smith’s leadership was considered so vital that when William 
Winder was placed in command of the city’s defenses, Brigadier General John Stricker, 
commander of the City Brigade, Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry, hero of Lake Erie, and Major 
Armistead, commander of Fort McHenry started a petition to reinstate Smith.126  Winder was 
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relieved and, bolstered by the strong performance of the Baltimore militia at Bladensburg, the 
Baltimoreans, under Smith’s leadership, prepared to meet the coming British attack.127 
When the British landed near North Point on September 12, Smith sent the City Brigade 
under John Stricker to delay the British advance and buy time for the completion of 
entrenchments on Hampstead Hill.  Stricker deployed his thirty-two hundred men along the 
British line of advance.  Fearing a night attack, Stricker chose to engage the British and sent 250 
men to entice the British forward.  Major General Ross, the victor of Bladensburg, rode forward 
to bring up his main force and was quickly shot by an American rifleman.  His successor, Arthur 
Brooke, ordered the British troops forward.  Cassell described the battle, “The spectacular but 
quite ineffective Congreve rockets that had frightened the American militia at Bladensburg failed 
to panic the disciplined Baltimore soldiers.  For nearly, one and a half hours Stricker’s men 
behaved like regulars, matching the British veterans volley for volley.”128   
As the battle progressed, the British pressed hard against Stricker’s left flank.  Stricker 
ordered one of his reserve regiments to block the assault but the men broke in confusion.  What 
followed showed that the militia, under good leadership, could be entrusted with the defense of 
the nation.  Instead of breaking and fleeing when finding their flank exposed, Stricker’s men 
calmly responded by shifting their positions.  The 39th Regiment, which had been on Stricker’s 
left, turned and took the former position of the 51st Regiment, while the 5th Regiment, which had 
been in reserve, took the place of the 39th.  This complicated maneuver was performed under fire, 
yet the militia did not break.129 
The British continued to move past Stricker’s line, however, and threatened in the rear, 
he ordered a retreat.  This did not turn into a rout as so many retreats, by regulars and militia, had 
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before. It was executed with precision, the militia turning to fire on the British as the Americans 
withdrew.  Frank Cassell said, “Stricker had performed his assigned mission better than anyone 
had a right to expect.  His men had never been in battle before, and yet they had withstood with 
honor an attack by professional troops fresh from the battlefields of Europe.”130 
Following the Battle of North Point, Brooke decided to wait until Fort McHenry was 
neutralized to press his attack.  After his experience on the 12th, he was hesitant to attack the 
American lines without heavy naval gunfire in support.  The Defense of Fort McHenry, later 
renamed The Star Spangled Banner, is well known.  What is not known is that the militia were 
there as well, manning the guns inside the fort “through the perilous fight” under Lieutenant 
Colonel George Armistead’s command.  Armistead reported that the militia performed well in 
the fight and had done everything asked of them.131 
In stark contrast to the Battle of Bladensburg, the Battle of North Point and Battle of 
Baltimore showed what the militia could do when led by capable officers.  Under men like Sam 
Smith, John Stricker, and George Armistead, the militia stood firm and drove off Wellington’s 
“Invincibles.”  In an address to Congress on September 20, Madison said, “In the recent attempt 
of the enemy on the city of Baltimore; defended by militia and volunteers, aided by a small body 
of regulars and seamen, he was received with a spirit which produced a rapid retreat to his 
ships.”132  In a letter to General Wilkinson earlier in the war, Secretary of War John Armstrong 
had stated that the militia could not be relied upon to act as an independent corps.  He stated that 
without regulars to prop them up, they could not be trusted.  Yet not a single regular soldier had 
been at the Battle of North Point and the militia had held their ground against a superior force of 
British veterans.  There, the militia proved that not only could they stand up to the British, they 




The Southern Theatre 
 The war in the South stands out for several reasons among the major areas of operation in 
the War of 1812.  While fighting began in 1812, American and British forces never met in the 
South until late 1814.  Climaxing in the Battle of New Orleans, famously fought after the peace 
treaty had been signed, the war in the South catapulted Andrew Jackson to the White House and 
produced several American legends.  Davy Crockett, Jim Bowie, and Sam Houston all served 
under Jackson in the militia.  Like the Northwest Frontier and the Atlantic Coast, the war in the 
South was fought almost exclusively by the militia.  Again, they would prove to be an effective 
fighting force under Jackson’s leadership and play an important role in the most decisive battle 
of the war. 
 The war in the South began in the fall of 1812.  The Georgia militia prepared for an 
expedition across the Florida border to attack the Natives and runaway slaves there.  However, 
by the time preparations were complete, the men had only seven days service left.  Their 
commander asked for volunteers to step forward but only eighty-four agreed.  Slightly 
reinforced, the expedition stepped off with 117 men.  The militia marched in a box-like 
formation to provide security, no easy feat.  When they were attacked on several sides by the 
Native warriors, they successfully repelled the attacks.  The militia, outnumbered three to one, 
stood firm.133  Their commander, Daniel Newman, complimented them, saying they conducted 
themselves, “with the steadiness of veterans.”134 
 The South was quiet from then until the Fort Mims Massacre in August 1813.  In 
response to the attack, Andrew Jackson called up two thousand militia to defend American 
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settlements in Tennessee and punish the Creeks.135  In November, Brigadier General John Coffee 
reported after a successful expedition that his Tenessee militia “appeared cool and 
determined”136  Later in the month, Jackson’s men engaged an Indian force and defeated them.  
While the company at the center of his line fled, most of the militia stood firm and those who 
fled soon rallied.137  Another expedition under Brigadier General James White achieved 
complete surprise over a Creek village, killing 60 warriors and capturing 316 while suffering no 
losses themselves.138  Brigadier General John Floyd led his force of 950 militia over 120 miles in 
7 days, a remarkable accomplishment.  They also killed two hundred warriors and burned several 
towns.139 In a later engagement, Floyd reflected proudly on his militia’s prompt response and 
obedience to orders.140 
 Jackson’s next expedition highlighted both the potential of the militia as well as some of 
their weaknesses.  Jackson wrote, “The motives which induced me to penetrate still further into 
the enemy’s country, with this force, were many and urgent.  The term of service of the new 
raised volunteers was short, and a considerable part of it was expired; they were expensive to the 
government, and were full of ardor to meet the enemy.”141  Jackson wanted to take advantage of 
his men’s eagerness to fight, but needed to do so before their enlistments expired.  However, 
Jackson soon encountered other issues, “The insubordination of the new troops, and the want of 
skill in most of their officers, also became more and more apparent.  But their ardor to meet the 
enemy was not diminished”142  After engaging a Creek force larger than his own, Jackson 
withdrew.  Expecting an attack on his column, he organized a strong rearguard.  But when the 
Creek attacked his force, most of the men broke and ran.143  Of the men who stayed, Jackson 
said, “They however, realized and exceeded my highest expectations….  Amidst the most galling 
fire from the enemy, more than ten times their number, they ascended the hill and maintained 
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their position, until their piece was hauled up, when, having levelled it, they poured upon the 
enemy a fire of grape, re-loaded and fired again, charged and repulsed them.”144  Jackson wrote 
later, “Had it not been for the unfortunate retreat of the rear guard in the affair on the 24th instant, 
I think I could safely have said that no army of militia ever acted with more cool and deliberate 
bravery” and “the retreat of the rearguard…ought rather be ascribed to the want of conduct in 
many of their officers than to any cowardice in the men, who on every occasion have manifested 
a willingness to perform their duty so far as they knew it.”145  Despite his displeasure, Jackson 
recognized that the militia, if better led, were a potent force.  They proved him right at the Battle 
of Horseshoe Bend. 
 In March 1814, Jackson led a force towards the last major Creek stronghold, called by 
whites the Horseshoe Bend.  The Creeks had built a barricade across a narrow peninsula created 
by a crook in the Tallapoosa River.  Jackson bombarded the barricade for two hours while he 
sent half his force to surround the Creek along the river under General John Coffee.  Jackson 
then launched a bayonet charge which took the position as Coffee’s men attacked in the rear.  
The Creeks were annihilated. American casualties, however, were relatively light, only 150 
wounded and 50 killed, compared to 800 fallen Creek warriors.146 
 Jackson’s comments about the militia following the battle were positive, reflecting their 
effectiveness.  Addressing the army four days after the battle, Jackson said “it has redeemed the 
character of your state, and of that description of troops, of which the greater part of you are.”147  
In a letter to his superiors, Jackson again complimented the militia saying, “conduct of the militia 
on this occasion has gone far towards redeeming the character of that description of troops.  
They have been orderly in their encampments, and on their line of march, as they have been 
signally brave in the day of battle.”148  The praise did not stop there.  On September 20, President 
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Madison addressed Congress saying, “The bold and skilful operations of Major General Jackson, 
conducting troops drawn from the militia of the states least distant, particularly of Tennessee, 
have subdued the principal tribes of hostile savages, and by establishing a peace with them, 
preceded by recent and exemplary chastisement, has best guarded against the mischief of their 
co-operation with the British enterprises which may be planned against that quarter of our 
country.”149   
However the threat to the South was not over, as Admiral Alexander Cochrane’s forces, 
reinforced by more veterans from Europe prepared to strike at New Orleans and the southern 
militia prepared to face the British for the first time.  The British landed near New Orleans on 
December 23, 1814 and that night Jackson launched his men at the British encampment.  The 
British were unprepared and the militia made good progress.  Jackson said later, “General 
Coffee’s men, with their usual impetuosity, rushed the enemy’s right and entered their camp.”150 
Jackson was pleased but not surprised by their excellent performance; he had come to expect it.  
Of the other units involved Jackson wrote, “The battalion of city militia, commanded by Major 
Planche, realized my anticipations, and behaved like veterans.  Savary’s volunteers manifested 
great bravery: and the company of city riflemen having penetrated into the midst of the enemy’s 
camp, were surrounded, and fought their way out with the greatest heroism, bringing with them a 
number of prisoners.”151  Having unsettled the British, Jackson retired in good order and fell 
back to begin construction of a defensive line south of New Orleans.152 
 The Battle of New Orleans took place on January 8.  Major General Edward Pakenham, 
knowing that Jackson’s left consisted of Tennessee militia under John Coffee aimed his main 
thrust at what he assumed was the weakest part of Jackson’s line.  Pakenham had misjudged the 
mettle of the Tennesseans but it mattered little; the British assault was doomed from the start.  
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The legend of the militia standing behind cotton bales, mowing down British regulars is just that, 
a legend.  The notion that it was the Kentucky riflemen who won the battle, perpetuated by 
people like Johnny Horton, is even more far-fetched.  The Kentuckians were the rawest element 
in Jackson’s army and nearly one-third were unarmed.153  In reality, it was the American artillery 
that did most of the damage and the British lost the battle more than the Americans won.  
Jackson’s defense was not so much brilliant as the British attack was suicidal.  However, the 
militia did play their part and on the west bank, held their ground against what was an awe-
inspiring force.154  Jackson said afterwards, “more could not have been expected from veterans 
inured to war.”155 
 There was one flaw in the otherwise spectacular American victory.  A crucial part of 
Pakenham’s plan had been an assault on the American artillery on the east bank of the river.  
Pakenham planned to capture the batteries and use them to enfilade Jackson’s line while the 
main assault took place.  It was a sound tactic but the boats ferrying his men across the 
Mississippi River were caught in the current and this assault did not land until after the main 
attack had been defeated.  Once the British landed, they easily scattered the militia guarding the 
cannon on the east bank.156  Jackson fiercely chastised the Kentuckians saying, “The want of 
discipline, the want of order, a total disregard to obedience, and a spirit of insubordination, not 
less destructive than cowardice itself, are the causes that led to this disaster, and they must be 
eradicated, or I must cease to command.”  However, Jackson later learned that the commanding 
officer on the west bank had made no preparations for an attack and failed to deploy his troops.  
Accordingly, Jackson rescinded his negative remarks about the militia.157 
 Ironically, though the militia did not win Battle of New Orleans, it restored their status as 
the nation’s primary defense in the minds of many Americans.  Jackson himself played a large 
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part in this, addressing his army several times following the battle.  On January 21, 1815, he said, 
“This day completes the fourth week since fifteen hundred of you attacked treble your number of 
men, who had boasted of their discipline, and their services under a celebrated leader in a long 
and eventful war-attacked them in their camp the moment they had profaned the soil of freedom 
with their hostile tread and inflicted a blow which was a prelude to the final result of their 
attempt to conquer.”158 Jackson continued, “knowing that the volunteers from Tennessee and the 
militia from Kentucky were stationed on your left, it was there they directed their chief attack.  
Reasoning from false principles, they expected no opposition from men whose officers even 
were not in uniform, who were ignorant of the rules and dress, and who had never been caned 
into discipline-fatal mistake!” The British were cut down by “the untutored courage of the 
American militia.”159  He credited “the salvation of the country” to General Coffee’s Tennessee 
militia and said General Carroll’s militia “made it clear that a rampart of high-minded men is a 
better defense than the most regular fortification.”160  Jackson also praised the Louisiana and 
Mississippi militia who arrived after the battle and the African-American militia, saying “The 
two corps of colored volunteers, have not disappointed the hopes that were formed of their 
courage and perseverance in the performance of their duty.”161  Finally, Jackson proclaimed, 
“These are the saviours of their country; these patriot soldiers, who triumphed over the invincible 
of Wellington, and conquered the conquerors of Europe!”162 
 While Jackson’s claims were exaggerated, he was not wrong.  Despite their flaws and the 
many difficulties they overcame, the militia had performed their duties more often than not.  In 
battles like the Thames, Craney Island, Lundy’s Lane, North Point, and New Orleans, the militia 
stood their ground against the British and their Indian allies.  Militia officers like William H. 
Harrison, Andrew Jackson, Peter Porter, Jacob Brown, and Samuel Smith showed that the militia 
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could perform on level with British regulars when they were well trained and well led.  
Unfortunately, an almost nonexistent logistical system and mediocre officers prevented the 
militia from accomplishing more than they did.  Still, it was no exaggeration for Jackson to call 
them “the saviours of the country.”163 The militia played a vital role in the American “victory” in 
the War of 1812.  Though Madison constantly attempted to expand the Regular Army throughout 
the war, the militia bore the brunt of the fighting.164 Overall, they passed the test of combat and 
proved that the citizen soldier truly was capable of defending the young republic.  
Peter Porter once said, “a farmer fresh from the plow, may by a drill of six weeks, under 
proper officers, be rendered as efficient in all the duties of the field as a soldier of ten years 
standing.”165  Andrew Jackson, after the Battle of New Orleans stated that General Adair “has 
shown that troops will always be valiant when their leaders are so.”166  Both were correct.  Men 
who had little to no combat experience had followed officers like Porter, Jackson, and Stricker 
into seemingly impossible situations.  The same New York militia who had stood on the bank of 
the Niagara at the Battle of Queenston Heights later followed Peter Porter into the most hard 
fought battle of the war at Lundy’s Lane.  American soldiers with less training than some militia 
units that fought in the War of 1812 conquered Mexico thirty years later and decimated each 
other during the Civil War.  The crucial difference in these conflicts was that the soldiers were 
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